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/ 
CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS: 
The Man and His Works 
by 
Susan M. Voss 
'INTRODUCTION 
I 
"Claude Levi-Strauss, Professor of Social Anth-
ropology at the College de France, is, by com-
mon consent, the most distinguished exponent 
~f this particular academic trade to be found 
. ap.ywhere outside the English speaking world ... " 
(Leach 1970: 7) 
With this in mind, I am still wondering how I came to be embroiled 
in an attempt not only to understand the mul t:ifaceted theorizing of 
Levi-Strauss myself, but to interpret even a portion of this wide 
inventory to my colleagues. ' There is much (the maj ori ty, perhaps) 
of Claude Levi-Strauss which eludes me yet. To quote Edmund Leach 
again, rtThe outstanding characteristic of his writing, whether in 
French or in English, is that it is difficul tto unders tand; his 
sociological theories combine bafflingcoinplexity with overwhelm-
ing erudi tion"., (Leach 1970: 8) . In addition, the whole corpus of 
Lev~-Strauss' writings is packed with plays on words, oblique ref-
erences and puns.' I ask that the reader bear with my tentative 
exploration into the mind of this enigmatic man. 
EARLY YEARS 
/ 
Claude Levi-Strauss was born in Belgium in 1908, son of a 
French Jewish-turned-~gnostic artist who raised his son in an intel 
lectual atmosphere of ax' tis tiC: culture and -skepticism. ,Cuddihy 
(1974:155) makes much of Levi-Strauss' Jewish heritage, even to the 
point of stating that ~he develo~ment of his intellectual.tool, 
structuralism, was for the purpose of putting an end to the "trauma 
of status-loss inherent in Jewry's entry into the modernized West 
in the nineteenth century!'. Cuddihy contends Levi-Strauss uses 
this tool for these ends, but I can find little evidence to justify 
the contention. Even while having spent his early childhood years 
wi th his grandfather, who was (the rabbi of Versailles). Levi-
Strauss claims, liMy only contact with religion goes back to a stage 
in, my 'childhood at which I was already an unbliever" (emphasis 
added)(Levi-Strauss 1973b:215). 
Levi-Strauss says very little in his published works about his 
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childhood and youth. References to this time of his life are 
found primarily in the enchanting "travelogue", Tristes 
Trop'!qu_~_s, and are also salted sparingly and occasionally in 
other puolications. However, Gardner (1973:113) reveals 
that he was a "serious and somewhat romantic youngster" 
given to long, solitary walks, often ,~using over flora and 
fauna, and contemplative of philosophical problems. From 
an early age he was deeply interested in geology, later 
acknowledging that science as one of the three major intel-
lectual influences in his life. The other two, psycho-
analysis and Marxism, which L~vi-Strauss regarded as methods 
of science rather than as dogma, joined geology to become 
Levi-Strauss' "three mistresses." 
All three showed that understanding con-
sists in the reduction of one type of . 
reality to another; that true reality is 
never the most obvious of realities ... in 
all the cases the problem is the same: 
the relation between reason and sense 
perception ... " (Levi-Strauss 1973b:61) 
This question of the relationship between reason ~nd sense 
perception effected an'increasing importance in Levi-Strauss' 
theorizing over the ensuin~ years. 
COLLEGE YEARS ~\JD EARLY TEACHING CAREER 
Between the years 1927 and 1932, Levi-Strauss attended 
the University of Paris, graduating under the Faculty of 
Law with a degree in Philosophy. (His studies had included 
readings of the masters of the "French School of Sociology," 
notably Durkheim and Mauss; in fact, it was Mauss' "Essai 
sur Ie Don" which later piqued Le'vi-Strauss' interest in 
alliance theory.) Following graduation, Levi-Strauss accept-
ed a position in a French lycee, which he held for two years. 
But in 1934, two events occurred which w~re to have lasting 
consequence in the life of Levi-Strauss. The first of these 
was his reading of Robert Lowie'iPrimitive Society, L6vi-
Strauss' first introduction to specialist anthropological 
writing. Enchanted by the life described in this book, he 
eagerly took advantage of the opportunity provided by the 
second event. Through the patronage of Celestin BougIe, 
Director of the Ecole Normale Superieure, Levi-Strauss was 
offered a post as Professor of Sociology at the University of 
Sao Paulo, Brazil. He accepted within three hours. During 
the four years in which Levi-Strauss was at Sao Paulo, he 
made several brief visits to the interior of .Brazil, engaging 
in ethnographic investigations. The empirical data and 
intellectual capital accrued during those 'years have been a 
major source of ideas for most of Levi-Strauss' subsequent 
works. Levi-Strauss' first anthropological publication was 
in 1936 - a forty-five page article on the social organization 
of the Bororo Indians. 
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In 1938, having resigned from the University of Sao Paulo, he 
obtained from the Frerich Government financial support for an ex-
tensive expedition to central Brazil. While on the move much of 
the time, Levi-Strauss collected enough material on the Nambik-
wara and Tupi-Kawahib Indians to provide the basis for one of his 
best-known publications, Tristes Tropiques. Going in siarch of 
infini te variety,. and expecting to -find ei ther bloodthi rsty can-
nibals or Rousseau-like I'noble savages", Levi-Strauss instead dis-
covered the common humanity of mankind. He came to recognize that 
the similarities between himself an.d the long- isolated Nambikwara 
far out-weighed the differences. Levi-Strauss' (.recogni tion. of 
lICertain fundamental properties of the physical and psychical 
universe" (Levi-Strauss 1973b:61), was to become a recurrent theme 
in all of his writings. However, it.is important to mention that 
in spite of his "vis~onaryrt experience, the actual concrete ethno-
graphic data which Levi-Strauss compiled at this time could not 
have been of the quality which we have come to expect from Malin-
owski-style, fieldwork. IIi ·the whole course of his Brazilian 
travels, Levi-Strauss could not have spent more than a few weeks 
at a time in anyone place; nor was he ever abl~ to converse 
"easily with any of his informants in their native language. In 
his subsequent writings, he assumes that the initial "model" gen-
erated by an observer's first impressions actually represents 
ethnographic reality. It has become apparent in recent etic/emic 
anthropological theorizing that such a first stage model can be 
little more than the observers' own pre-packaged suppositions. 
This type of data can hardly be considered impeachable source 
material on which to base the foundation of one's life work. But 
my primary criticism of Levi-Strauss in this regard is not that 
he has relied so heavily .on. insufficient fieldwork, but that when 
called to defend his position wherever other data runs counter to 
his theories, he will either by-pass the evidence or sidestep the 
issue all together. (cf.Harris 1968: 499-512). Any data is accept-
able as long as it correlaies with his calculated expectations. 
One Is feminded of Levi-Strauss' training in philosophy and law:~ 
his behavior is that of an advocate defending· a cause rather 
than that of a scientist in pursuit of truth. 
What·was perhaps the most pivotal event in the life of 
Levi-Strauss was his meeting of the noted linguist Roman 
Jakobson in the year 1941. -During the two years prior to this 
date, Levi-Strauss had been in France on military service and 
had made his way, via Martinique and Puerto Rico, to New York, 
where he took up a post at the New School of Social Research, 
a position engineered for him by Robert Lowie. It was there 
that Jakobson introduced Levi-Strauss to the scientific approach 
which had wrought a "revolution" in linguistic study. The 
linguistic analysis of the Prague School, of' which Jakobson 
was a prominent figure, proposed that underiying the diversity 
of languages and phonological components there was a small set 
of basic distinctions (binary oppositions) which generated 
the diversities. Levi-Strauss seizec. upon this concept, 
feeling tllat if one could discover the underlying distinctions 
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which generated the diversities of culture, one could present 
an accurate and economical descriptlon of the range of cul~ 
tural manifestations. To implement the tenets of Jakobsoniar 
linguistics into cultural anthronology required studying th~ 
infrastructure of cultural phenomena rather than their appa-
rent manifestations; it is the relationships between the 
units of this realm as independent entities, and not the 
units themselves which will reveal the structure of a culture. <M"~ 
"It is not a question, naturally, of transferring linguistic 
analysis into anthropology, but of translatlng it into anthro-
pological terms" (original emphasis) (Le'vi-Strauss 1963b:37). 
However, such structural analysis in linguistics was not so 
neatly transferred to the discipline of anthropology. Lin-
guistics deals with signs and symbols which acquire meaning 
when cognitively associated with particular objects; but ther( 
are no conventional signs or symbols assoicated with social 
structure, political organization or family relationships. 
Levi-Strauss nevertheless proposed that cultural phenomena 
could, for the purpose of analysis, be assigned arbitrary 
symbols which would reflect the principle rarameters of cul-
tural domains, and which could be manipulated to reflect . 
genuine relationships among the phenomena. By cross-checking 
these results against ethnographies and personal observation, 
he hoped to confirm the production of empirical correlat~s~ 
The three principal phases of Levi-Strauss' scholarly works 
(i.e. kinship theory, the theory of primitive classification, 
and the logic of myth) have been an attempt to implement 
this research method -- Structuralism. 
THE STRUCTURALIST APPROACH 
Before discussing the products of Levi-Strauss' Struc-
turalism in the range of study indicated above, it would 
perhaps be instructive to consider the general arguments for, 
or justifications of, structuralist methodology. During 
the years between the first publication of The Elementary 
Structures of Kinship (1949) anli the long-overdue publication 
of Tristes Tropiques (1955), Levi-Strauss engaged in investi-
gation of certain other aspects of culture in an effoit to 
"test" his general concept of structural analysis. Some of 
the articles produced by these investigations appeared in 
1958 in the form of Structural Anthropology, a collection of 
essays which serves as an introductlon to structural dogma. 
For those interested in the potential of Structuralism, a 
later publication, Totemism (1963). clarifies the actual 
techniques of application of the discipline. 
The central thesis of Structuralism can be interpreted 
as follows: The phenomena of the external worle., which we 
perceive through our senses, are apprehended as having dis-
tinct characteristics because of the way our senses communicate 
these perceptions to the brain and the \'Jay the human brain 
interprets these stimuli. It is typical of this process that 
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the continuum of perceptions (space, time, etc.) is cut up into 
separate units or segments, thereby disposing our conception of 
the environment as consistin!! of discrete things belonging to 
recognizable, named classes, with the passage of time consis-
ting of sequences of distinct events. Therefore. when men 
produce material objects of culture, divise belief systems and 
associated ceremonials, and. keep written records of the past, 
it is in imitation of their apprehension of nature. All 
products of culture, wh~ther material or behavioral, are 
patterned after man's perception of nature as segmented and 
ordered. 
Is this mode of perception truly characteristic of the 
human brain in general, or Levi-Strauss' brain in particular? 
How does one actually use this explanation to implement struc-
tural analysis of phenomena? There is a big step between cause 
and effect, and to my way of thinking, a great deal of con-
j ecture necessary to take this step. Irrespective of my "lay of 
thinking, the following is an example of the "strategy" of the 
thesis: Given a continuum, such as the color spectrum, there 
is no natural point at which one color changes to another, 
for instance, green to yellow or yellow to red. Nevertheless, 
the human brain is able to discriminate between ~reen and 
yellow, and yellow and red. This "ordering mechanism" allows 
for anyone not colorblind to be able to recognize that green 
is the opposite of red, and, becuase of this, we may assign 
the signals - and + as if they corresponded to green and red. 
It is interesting that in many cultures besides our own, red 
is consistently treated as a sign of danger, perhaps from 
its "natural" association with blood. At any rate, with 
traffic lights in our eel ture, green means- GO and red means 
STOP. If we need a further signal to indicate intermediate 
meaning (about to STOP, about to GO), we choose the color 
yellow. This is done because, in the spectrum yellow lies 
halfway bet\veen green and red. In this system, then, the 
ordering of the colors is the same as that of the instruc~ons: 
GO-CAUTION-STOP:green-yellow-red. They both have the same 
"structure;'" the one is a transformation of the other, and 
the final cultural product, a three-color traffic. si~nal, is 
a simplified imitation of a phenomenon of nature as apprehended 
by the human brain. However, 
!1because this viewpoint offers distinct 
advantages, allowing properties of human 
societies - what riarcel Mauss called 'facts 
of general functioning' - to emerge which 
might otherwise remain hidden under a mass 
of exotic and incomprehensible surface detail, 
how can it guarantee the reality of these 
structural categories which exist only at the 
l.mconscious level" (VonSturmer 1970:11)? 
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In .the above example, the sequence of colors in the 
spectrum very neatly transfers to the sequence of colors in 
the traffic. signal, and the selection of red for "STOP-DANGER" 
seems to be a natural one, as mentioned previously. There-
fore, the correlation between the two triads is more or less 
predetermined 1 artd we do not need to.ccnsider alternative 
possibilities offered by the rest of the matrix. But suppose, 
in a general case, that there is no ,pparent correlation 
between the. patterns. Strpctural analysis needs to proceed 
by setting out all the possible combinations of components 
and examining the empirical evidence on a comparative basis. 
"TIle method we adopt, . . . cons is ts of 
the, following operations: 
1. define the phenomenon under study as a 
relation between two or more terms, real 
or supposed: 
11. construct a table of possible permutations 
between these terms; 
111.' take this table as the general object 
of analysis which, at this level only, can 
yield ,necessary. connections, the empirical 
phenomenon considered at the beginning bein~ 
only one possible combinati,on among others, 
the complete system of which much be con-
st~ucted beforehand" (Levi-Strauss 1963a:16). 
The purpose of this exercise is to establish how relations 
which are inherent in nature and recognized as such by the 
human mind ate used to generate cultural, phenomena involving 
the smae relations. It is L6vi-Strauss' contention that by 
discovering bow different peoples apprehend nature, it will 
be possibl~ to infer crucial facts about 'the mechanism of 
thinking as manifested in cultural diversity. It is impor-
tant to understand that, in spite of the cultural differences 
which c~n be observed in cross-cultural comparisons, because 
all cultutesare the product of human minds? there must be, 
beneath th~surface, f~atures that are universal. These 
universals exist only at the level of structure, and never 
at the level of manifest fact. Levi-Strauss attaches no 
importance to the recurrence'or l.;;lck of occurrence of parti-
cular 'customs on a wqrldwide basis. In his view s lITe may 
'usefully compare only the patterning of the relations which 
might link together sets of human Lehavior; there is nothing 
to be gained from comparing single cultural items as isolates. 
The general object of analysis is conceived as a kind of 
algebraic matrix of possible p~rmutations and combinations 
located in the unconscious huma~ mind; the empirical evidence 
is merely an example of what is possible. 
liThe structure of relations which can be 
discovered by analyzing materials drawn 
from anyone culture is an algebraic 
transformation of other possible structures 
belor-ging to a common set and this common 
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set constitutes a pattern which reflects an 
attribute of the mechanism of all human brains" 
(Leach 1970:53). 
This is a grand conception, but its usefulness is a matter 
of opinion. Among his professional collea~ues, there is 
little doubt as to Levi-Strauss' brilliance and fecundity, 
but suspicion remains and in some quarters is hardening into 
open hostility (HaJ11mel: 1972). One of the reasons for" this, I 
believe from my own encounter with the writings of Levi-Strauss, 
is that many of his colleagues have not or can not read him! 
He is charged with imposing his own mentality on the world, 
with endowing the inte~ligible with intelligence, and with 
revealing more about Levi-Strauss than about the objects 
of his inquiry. 
"An analysis of his . . . \<lork is '. , 
illuminating for it reveals~n obsession 
with the Nature/Culture opposition and 
the notion of alliance. The patterns 
of L~vi-Straussi thoughts emerge clearly, 
but what of the Indians" (emphasis 
added) (VonSturmer 1970:13)? 
His is an unfamiliar style of discourse and it must be admitted 
that there is an element of verbal sleight of hand which in-
vites caution rather than enthusiasm. _ However, those who 
weary of the tortuous gymnastics of Levi-Straussian argument 
need to recognize his unique capicity of leading the reader 
all unaware into the innermost recesses of his "secret"moti-
vations. Clearly, the abundance of theory generated by Levi-
Strauss over the past thirty years has been a significant 
contribution; while many of his theses remain muddy water to 
the uninitiateJ, they have certainly stimulated a flurry of 
interest in hi.s "intellectual tool" and by this means, hope-
fully, . genera ted the kind of research investigation l"hich may 
ultimately produce a methodology which could enjoy broad-
spectrum application. At any rate, Levi-Strauss is not to 
be taken lightly. 
SCHOLARLY WORKS 
Turning to the aspects of Levi-Strauss' scholc71y works, 
we may conceive of them as a three-pointed star radiating 
around a nucleus of Structuralism. It is beyond the scope of 
this paper and my expertise to treat fully th~ entire range 
of theory which has sprung from t~e mind of Levi-Strauss. 
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But I will attempt to give a brief synopsis of the major POints 
on which his primary areas of endeavor pivot. 
KINSHIP 
.. In his study of kinship, Levi-Strauss proceeds in a 
fashl?n.contrarr to most of his predecessors. Rather than 
~xpla~n1~g the 1~cest taboo on the ba~is of marriage rules, 
he exp1~1ns marr~age ruJes on the bas1s of the incest taboo 
In a v~nn smacking of social Darwinism, Levi-Strauss maintains tha~, 1n th~ ~ourse of evolution, human societies had the 
cho1ce of ~1v1ng away their women ~o cement political alliances 
or of keep1ng them to themselves and running the risk of b~in~ , 
annihilated by superior enemies. In this situation, natural ~ 
selection would favor societies enforcing rules of exogamy .. · This 
equates with the function of the incest taboo. The fatal flaw 
of incest is that it precludes the possibility of formation 
of larger kinship systems by .restricting the possibility of 
exchanging women and establishing alliances. If survival of 
a society is dependent upon al1iance 1 strong sanctions against 
incest must be interdicted. 
"The primitive and irreducible character 
of the kinship unit is a consequence of 
the incest taboo . . . In human society 
a man cannot get a woman except from 
another man, who entrusts him with his 
daughter or sister ll (Levi-Strauss 1969a: 
41) . 
The taboo has no other object than to permit the circulation 
or women, and in this sense, is a counterpart of the obliga-
tion to give a thesis of Mauss to which Levi-Strauss' con-
tention " ... that exogamy ... was the archety~e of all 
practices based upon reciprocity, and that marriage alliances 
were the essential basis of the social structure" (Gardner 
1973:127). But the important thing for Levi-Strauss, in con-
sideration of the incest taboo, is that the existence of this 
phenomenon provides the "missing link" in man's transition 
from a state of nature to a siate of culture. It was the 
first self-sacrifice in sexual matters and all of its atten-
dant subsequent for~s rif reciprocity which elevated man from 
an animal state to a cultural state, with language. customs, 
and traditions following. 
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To complicate matters, Levi-Straus·s recognizes further 
characteristics of these forms of exchange, which he distin-
guishes by the terms "harmonic" and "disharmonic," a distinction 
based on the relationship between rules of residence and 
rules of descent. lIe recognizes only two types of descent -
patrilineal and matrilineal, and two types of resiJence -
viri1oca1 and uxoriloca1. Systems which are patrilineal/ 
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virilocal or matrilineal/uxorilocal are harmonic; systems 
which arc patrilineal/uxorilocal or matrilineal/virilocal 
are cisharmonic. Levi-Strauss maintains that harmonic struc-
tures are unstable and that disharmonic structures are stable, 
so that structures of the first type will tend to evolve into 
structures of the second type. Harmonic systems of restricted 
exchange, therefore, provide the foundation from which harmonic 
systems of generalized exchange may emerge. 
"A harmonic system with restricted ex-
change, he reasons, can never rise 
a.ove a dual organization or a combination 
of separate dual organizations; that 
is, can never embrace the whole community 
in a total exchange system, unless it 
becomes either asymmetric or disharmonic" 
(Dejong 1952:19). 
Regardless of the merits of this argument, it should be pointed 
out that Levi-Strauss' general procedure for marriage alliance 
analysis is the same as that discussed in an earlier portion 
of this paper in the context of traffic signals. He treats 
possible preferences for marriage with particular cousins as 
forming a set of logical alternatives, compliance with which 
results in different overall patterns of social solidarity 
within the total society. These different kinship system 
possibilities constitute a set of components which are mani-
fested in sets of kinship termsa-nd in illsti tutions of 
marriage and exchange. Taken all together, the components 
will embody clues as to the internalized logic of the human 
mind. 
THE Hm'IAN riIND 
/ 
By now it should be cleaT that Levi-Strauss is very 
nearly obsessed with the internal working of the human mind, 
to the point that he regards anthropology properly as the 
study of the mind. Only by the confirmation of his theory 
of the brain's operation on the basis of distinction of per-
ception through binary opposition of characteristics, can 
Levi-Strauss' position on the nature of cultural manifesta-
tions be verified. It was this interest, this need, which 
stimulated the composi tion of two of his most eruel i te lvorks, 
Totemism and The Savage Mind, both published in 1962. His 
purpose -in thIs--enaeav-6-r--was to demonstrate the basic princi-
ples of the working of the human mind and to illustrate that 
there is no qualitative difference 'between the minds of so-
called "primi tives" and minds of sophisticated l\Testerners. 
Because of the limitations placed on the mind by such reality 
factors as length of lifetime, proximity of other tribes, 
availability of women and natural resources, etc., Levi-Strauss' 
attention later turned increasingly toward domaIns such as 
myth classification, in which, he reasoned? there were fewer 
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restraints upon the mind and it could be given free rein to 
reveal .its organization and parameters of functioning. These' 
efforts culminated in the "Mythologiques" (the logic of myth), 
a tetralogy consisting of The Raw and the Cooked (1964), 
From Honey to Ashes (1966), On the Origin of Table I'1anners (1968), and The Naked Han (1972). ---------------
Levi-Strauss begins his illustration- of the universal 
aspects of the functioning of the human mind by a considera-
tion of the widespread practice of totemism, a phenomenon 
which has long been used as an example of a state of primitive 
mentality. It is Levi-Strauss' contention that the naming of 
individuals or clans after particular plant or animal species 
is not due to those individuals or clans thinking themselves 
to be, for in~tance, beavers or eagles, nor is it due to the 
members living like beavers or eagles; rather as one plant 
or animal species differs from another, so do the. members of 
one totemic group differ from membe,!'s of another. "It is not 
th~ resemblances but the differe~c~s which resemble each oth~r' 
(Levi-Strauss 1963a: 63). It is a recognition of a "class 
structure," if you will, in the state of nature which is 
transferred, 'and therefore analagous ,to, a system of social 
ordering in the state of culture. Furthermore, the "primitive'" 
does not confei the name of beaver ~r eagle upon his clan 
because these creatures provide him with something "good to eat" 
(bonnes a manger), but because they provide him with something 
"good to think" (bonnes a penser). In other words, totemic 
species are not given social value because they are of economic 
value, but because the species are considered as categories 
which in themselves are, socially valuable. '?They are appro-
priate vehicles for capturing the perceptual distinctions 
which have impressed themselves upon the individual or group-" 
(Gardner 1973:135-136). Because all minds perceive stimuli 
on the basis of contra,sts and opposi tions, it must also have. 
some mechanism for mediation between them. As a result, objects 
which are "good to think" are thos'e which embody the opposing 
qualities \1hich originally captured the feeling ,of "identi- -, ;~_ 
fication 'l of the thinker. The very existence of these media, tors 
helps to resolve the cqntradictions and, if not that, at least 
provides a suspension of the oppo~ti6ns. 
"For human (as distinct 'from animal) sur-
vival every member of society must learn 
to distinguish his fellqw men according 
to their mutual social st'atus., ... The 
simplest way to do this,'is to apply ti~ns­
formations of the animal level categories 
to the social classifiCation of human 
beings. This is the key point in Levi-
Strauss' Structuralist approach to the 
classic anthropological theme of Totemism" 
(Leach 1970:40). 
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Clearly, this type of association is evidence of conceptual 
thought and the capacity for abstraction. 
Levi-Strauss expands on this argument by providing 
examples of precise, scientific knowledge on the part of 
primitive peoples. (Examples of this kind are common enough 
'knowledge among anthropologists, and I will not reiterate 
any of them here.) He recognizes in these examples a quality 
of scientific knowledge which is not exactly the saMe as that 
of the Western scientist, but rather a parallel mode of 
acquiring knowledge, which he labels the "science of the con-
crete." Levi-Strauss maintains that the scientific operations 
of both Western adn Primitive societies is based upon the 
classification of objects and phenomena. The scie~ce of the 
concretei however, engages in~classification by sensory pro-
perties, such as odor and appearance, and does not engage in 
classification on the basis of anatomical properties or evo-
lutionary development of species. Levi-Strauss establishes 
that both modes of acquiring knowledge nevertheless give rise 
to organized, self-consistent systems; they.:at;e the products 
of identical mental manipulations, differing only in the 
types of phenomena under consideration ane the parameters for 
qualification for membership in a classification. 
Conversely, to. demonstrate that the thought process of 
"civilized man" is indeed not so very far removed from that 
of "primitives," Levi-Strauss illustrates circumstances in 
which Western man unhesitatingly displays primitive reasoning. 
An example which very convincingly substantiates this is the 
emotional attachment we have to historical documents, land-
marks, shrines, etc. When one is told, for instance, that 
"George Washington slept here," it is not really crucial 
whether or not, in fact, he did. What is important is that 
the-person believes that George Washington slept there and 
the~eby experiences the appropriate emotion. In addition, 
one can imagine the emotional trauma which would occur should 
some sacred family object, such~s Great-G!sndpa's gold watch, 
be lost or· damaged. It is as if all the ideals and concepts 
of value and permanence associated with these objects were 
lost as well. One final example, which would have been 
equally volatile amunition for Levi-Strauss' artillery in 
the discussion of totemism, should suffice in exp~sing this 
tenet. 
~lIt is a fact of empirical observation 
that human .beings everywhere aJort ritual 
attitudes tqwards the animals and plarits 
in their vicinity. Consider, for example, 
th~;separate, and often bizarre, rules 
which govern the behaviour of Englishmen 
towards the creatures which they classify . 
as: Ci) \-vild animals, (ii) foxes, 
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(iii)' game, (iv) farm animals, (v) pets, 
(vi) vermin. Notice further that if we 
take the sequence of words: (ia) strangers, 
(iia) enemies, (iiia) friends, (iva) 
neighbors, (va) companions, (via) criminals , 
the two sets of terms are in some 4egree homo16-
gous. By a metaphorical usage the categories 
of animals could be (and3sometimes are) used 
as equivalents for the categories of human 
beings. One of Levi-Strauss' major con-
tributions to our understanding has been to 
show how very widespread is this kind Qf 
socialisation of animal categories" (Leach 
1970:40). 
It becomes apparent, that "primitives" alone do not have the 
corner on primitive reasoning. 
To finalize his arguments for the universality of the 
structure of thought, Levi-Strauss turns to practices of 
naming, classifying, categorizing, universalizing and par-
ticularizing. He demonstrates that the rationale for label-
ing and grouping, while most clearly reflected in the th~n~ing 
of primitive societies, is not solely the property of pr1ID1-
tive societies and that it is not based on utilitarian or 
functional considerations. It is Levi-Strauss' thesis that 
it is the mind's capacity for and characteristic of sorting, 
clustering, opposing and mediating which predetermine its 
organization ,of percepts. In demonstration of this assertion, 
he goes to great lengths in consideration of Western prac-
tices of naming pets, and domestic and wild animals, claiming 
that such practices are universal human modes of eX"f)ression 
of recognition of attributes. Whether or not such modes of 
expression are in fact universal, the discussion does shed 
some light on unfamiliar aspects of our own familiar behavior. 
The presentation engages in this manner: For us, dogs, 
because they are pets, are a part of human sotiety while being 
not quite human. This relationship finds expression in the 
kinds of names we attach to dogs, names which ar~ like human 
names but nearly always slightly different. Birds, on the 
other hand, are given nicknames fully comparahleto normal 
human names, ~ Jenny Wren, Robin Redbreast, etc. The 
difference is---rnat the nnon-human" names given to pet dOQS 
are names of individuals, while the "human" names assigned 
to birds aee indiscriminately applied to any member of a 
whble species. This type of distinction is that of metonymic 
vs. metaphoric modes of symbolic association. Levi-Strauss 
contends that birds may be given human christian names more 
easily than othei animal classes because, since they are so 
different, they may be permitted to resemble men! Because of 
this ready 'difference between men and birds, and because of 
birds' independence of our own soci~ty, it is permissable 
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ro recognize those attributes of aviary society whic~l appear to us 
as homologous to thit in which we live, i.e., love of freedom, 
bui lding of homes and nurturing of the young,. engaging in social 
relations, and communicating by acoustic means. . "Consequently 
everything objective conspires to. make us think of the bird world 
as a metaphorical human society" (Levi:-Strauss 1966: 203). Exactly 
the opposite holds true in the case of dogs. Forming an integral 
part of human society, and dependent upon it, dogs must be design-
ated in a fashion which imitates but does not duplicate human 
designations. The names given to dogs 
"are like stage names, forming a series para-
llel to the names people bear in ordinary life 
or, in other words, metaphorical names.' Con-
sequently when the relation between (human 
and animal) species is socially conceived as 
metaphorical, the relation between the re-
spective systems of naming takes on a meto-
nymical character; and when the relation be-
tween species is conceived as metonymical, the 
system of naming assumes a metaphorical 
character" (Levi-Strauss 1966: 204-205)." 
Levi-Strauss then goes on to make further learned generalizations 
about the names which French farmers give to thei r COl"S and the 
names conferred upon racehorses: 
, '''Now the names given to cattle belong to a 
differ~nt series f~om birds' or dogs'. They 
are generally descriptive terms referring to 
the colour of their coats, their bearing or 
temperament: 'Rustaud', 'Rus~et' ,Blanchette', 
'Douce I, etc. these names have 'a metaphorical 
character but they differ from the names given 
to dogs in that ... the former ... tend to derive 
from speech (oral tradition), the latter from 
language (learned tradition)" (parenthetical 
notations added) (Levi-Strauss 1966:206). 
(The tiames of racehorses have the quality they 
do have because racehorses:) "do not form 
part of human society either as subjects or 
objects. Rather, they constttut~ the de-
socialised condition of a private society; 
that which lives off race-courses:or frequents 
them" (Levi-Strauss 1966:206). 
Cattle are viewed as objects of economic value, with no interest in 
thei r individual iden ti ties; they are; seEm in' re lationship to 
humans merely as extensions of our technology. Racehorses, on the 
other hand, are named in a way which will reflect their distinct-
i veness and individual identi ties; though .isolated, ,they be long to 
a society founded on competition, and are therefore paralle 1 to 
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humans. Despite these differentiations, neither cattle nor 
racehorses form an actual part of human society and are 
therefore considered inhuman beings. L~vi-Strauss sums up 
the situation with a statement which is totally recondite: 
"If therefore birds are metaphorical human 
beings and dogs metonymical human beings, 
cattle may be thought of as metonymical 
inhuman beings. Cattle are contiguous 
only for want of similarity, racehorses 
similar only for want of contiguity. 
Each of these two categories offers the 
converse image of one of the two other 
categories, which themselvesstand in the 
re lation of inverted symmetru'! (Levi-
strauss 1966:207). 
I suspect that Levi-Strauss is playing semantic games. 
, " . 
Is the juxtaposition of a type of name and a type of social 
context anything more than a debating trick? The train of 
thought is fascinating, but what sort of "truth" is involved? 
I am tempted to cast my lot with those who charge that Levi-
strauss is revealing more about the workings of his own mind 
than about the subject matter proper! 
Moving on to consideration of the "My thologiques" , we 
find ourselves on even less sure footing. In fact, Von 
Sturmer (1970:16) claims that one anthropologist has re-
marked that "reviewing the second book in the series was the 
most arduous task of that sort he could remember havigg 
assumed". My own exposure to the tetralogy is incomplete, 
and unfortunately, no analysis of it, comparable to that by 
Dejong on kinship and marriage, has, to my know~edge, been 
published. Nevertheless ,I will attempt to give a brief 
overview of the principles motivating Levi-Straussian myth 
analysis. 
MYTH 
For some time previous to his actual involvement with 
the analysis of myth, Levi-Strauss had been concerned with 
the basic issue of how and why it is that men, who are a 
part of nature, are able to see themselves ~s distinct from 
nature, even though, in order to exist, they must contin-
uously function as a part of nature. It was Levi-Strauss' 
reasoning that the answer to this question would reveal it-
self in the context of myth analysis. As stated previously 
in this paper, it is in the domron'of myth construction that 
the mind is freed from the obligations and restrictions of 
reali ty and is able, therefore, to display its innate low of 
operation which reflects the structure of all men's minds. 
Taken at face value, any body of mythological tales gives 
the impression of a tremendous diversity of tri.vial 
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incidents in association with frequent repetition and recurrent 
emphasis on rather primary themes. L6vi-Strauss postulates that 
behind the conspicuous sense of the tales there must be an incon-
spicuous non-sense, a message concealed in the Hcode ll of myth. 
According to Gardner (1973:147), 
"He tries to show that simple empirical cate-
gories - t~e perception of light, darkness, 
smell, noise, silence, etc. - can be treated 
as conceptual tools for such abstract ideas 
as the relationship between Nature and Culture, 
the characteristics of the incest taboo, and 
the importance of certain kinsllip and social 
arrangements; . and that these ideas, moreover, 
can be incorporated into logical propositions". 
Here, as elsewhere, Levi-Strauss' ultimate concern is with "the 
unconscious nature of collective phenomena" (Levi-Strauss 1966:18). 
By a sampling of the variety of myths produced cross-culturall 
Levi-Strauss expected to be able to isolate those elements which 
constitute the essen<;:e of myth. He was convinced that many of the 
different myths in any culture operate with the same basic con-
stituents, which do not have an accidental relationship to one 
another, and that the rules for combination of the constituents 
to transform one myth into another 'could be determined. After a 
survey of more than 800 ,North and South American Indian myths, 
Levi-Strauss claims to have found a formula for doing this and it 
has been his intention to demonstrate, through the success of this 
approach, the logic inherent in the body of myth. 
In the. first two volumes of the flMythologiques", Levi-Strauss 
is concerned with the eating of food and how,eating differentiates 
man from other animals. The Raw and the Cooked is an attempt to 
demonstrate a logic of ' properties based upon the opposition between 
what is raw and therefore part of Nature, from what is cooked and 
therefore part of Culture. It is L~vi-Strauss' proposition that, 
on the plane of food, the distinction between raw and cooked is 
the same as the distinction between Nature and Culture on the 
plane of society, betWeen sacred and profane oh the plane of 
religion, and between silence and noise on the plane of sound. 
His justification for th~s proposition is roughly that, because we 
are all men, '~e are all llart' of Nature; because we are human, we 
are all part of ·Cu1ture. Survival as men requires the eating of 
food (a part of Nature); survival a~umans require the utiliza-
tion of social categories which are derived from cultural class-
ifications imposed on elements of Nature. When we eat, a firect 
identity is established between food (Nature) and ourselves (Cul-
ture); c()oking is thereby a uni vers al means of converting Nature 
into Culture. . This line of' reasoning is expanded in From Honey to 
Ashes, in which Levi-Strauss treis to demonstrate a logic of form, 
between above/below; this world/other world, and (of course) 
Nature/Culture, which is the foundation of the properties described 
above. Honey i~,¥Quired from Nature and is consumed as food; 
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tobacco is acquired through Culture and is consumed other 
than as food. 
It is Levi-Strauss' thesis that the function of mythology 
is to exhibit publicly, though: in disguise, ordinarily .un-
conscious paradoxes of the kind described, and that the 
ultimate conclusion of analysis is not that all myths say 
the same thing but that, taken collectively, what all myths 
say is said collectively. Having not read the final two 
volumes of the "Mythologiques 11, I cannot speak personally 
of their content and will demur to the excellent summary of 
the material as presented by Gardner (1973:148): 
"The Mythologiques represent, overall, 
Levi-Strauss' comprehensive effort to 
demonstrate that all patterns of human 
behavior are codes; that the mind's 
inherent structuring tendency- operating 
in terms of a limited set of inborn prin-
ciples - conditions and determines the 
form of social phenomena, and of important 
forms of relations among human beings: 
differences in status, networks of friend-
ship, feelings of hostility, etc. Such 
relations are dealt with in myths by means 
of various codes relating to categories of 
food, sound or silence, smell and taste 
landscapes, seasonal changes, climate, 
celestial bodies, shelter, animal and 
plant life. The terms or objects appear-
ing in myths may differ, but the underly-
ing laws of discourse, and the operative 
ecological and social constraints, are in-
variable. Myths are designed to deal with 
problems of human existence which seem in-
soluble; they embody and express such 
dilemmas in the coherently structured form, 
and so serve to render them intelligible'. 
Through their structural similarity to 
given 'real world" situations,myths est-
ablish a point of repose or equilibrium 
which men can come to grips with the crucial 
components of the problem, and become aware 
of the 'fix' they are in. Thus, a myth is 
both intellectually satisfying and socially 
solidifying". 
SUMMARY AND .. CON.eLUSIONS 
An evaluation of "!the work of L€vi-Strauss can only be 
assessed in operational terms. If, by application of the 
techniques of analysis expounded by Levi-Strauss to an 
actual body of anthropological data, one is able to discern 
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insights not had before and if these insights provide illumination 
of other related ethnographic ~aterial which were not previously 
considered, then the exercise has been worthwhile. 
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